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AbstrAct
Objectives A patient safety intervention was tested in 
a 33-ward randomised controlled trial. No statistically 
significant difference between intervention and control 
wards was found. We conducted a process evaluation of 
the trial and our aim in this paper is to understand staff 
engagement across the 17 intervention wards.
Design Large qualitative process evaluation of the 
implementation of a patient safety intervention.
Setting and participants National Health Service staff 
based on 17 acute hospital wards located at five hospital 
sites in the North of England.
Data We concentrate on three sources here: (1) analysis 
of taped discussion between ward staff during action 
planning meetings; (2) facilitators’ field notes and (3) 
follow-up telephone interviews with staff focusing on 
whether action plans had been achieved. The analysis 
involved the use of pen portraits and adaptive theory.
Findings First, there were palpable differences in the 
ways that the 17 ward teams engaged with the key 
components of the intervention. Five main engagement 
typologies were evident across the life course of the study: 
consistent, partial, increasing, decreasing and disengaged. 
Second, the intensity of support for the intervention at the 
level of the organisation does not predict the strength of 
engagement at the level of the individual ward team. Third, 
the standardisation of facilitative processes provided by 
the research team does not ensure that implementation 
standardisation of the intervention occurs by ward staff.
Conclusions A dilution of the intervention occurred during 
the trial because wards engaged with Patient Reporting 
and Action for a Safe Environment (PRASE) in divergent 
ways, despite the standardisation of key components. 
Facilitative processes were not sufficiently adequate to 
enable intervention wards to successfully engage with 
PRASE components.
Background
Measurement of patient safety has traditionally 
relied on information from staff such as inci-
dent reports or recording information about 
harms such as falls or pressure sores. Recently, 
patients have been emphasised as being an 
important detector for patient safety and 
likened to the ‘smoke detectors’ of safety.1 There 
is an increasing recognition that hospitals need 
to find better ways to capture and respond to 
the concerns of patients regarding the quality 
and safety of their care.2–4 However, patients 
are rarely asked about structural or procedural 
aspects of care which may contribute towards 
failures in patient safety. The Yorkshire Quality 
and Safety group have developed a patient 
safety intervention called Patient Reporting 
and Action for a Safe Environment (PRASE). 
This intervention first elicits patient percep-
tions on how a ward is performing on a series of 
issues which are known to contribute towards 
patient safety incidents and second, assists staff 
to interpret patient feedback to aid service 
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Research
Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► We devised a process evaluation that had several 
robust qualitative data collection methods which 
complemented each other to build a comprehensive 
and holistic picture of how ward staff implemented 
the intervention.
 ► Our approach allowed us to reveal how the 
differing ways in which staff teams engage with the 
intervention may impact on patient safety changes 
at a ward level.
 ► Our novel analytic approach used pen portrait 
methodology in a differing way to how it has 
previously been used in health services research to 
document the journey of 17 wards interacting with 
an intervention over an 18-month period.
 ► We have little understanding of whether the 
implementation of Patient Reporting and Action for 
a Safe Environment  may have gained traction and 
fuelled subsequent ward-based change once the 
research team left the field.
 ► The qualitative methods we chose were designed 
to capture a broad understanding of the contexts 
in which the intervention was implemented but had 
we known a priori that engagement was such a 
significant factor, we may have designed the process 
evaluation to specifically explore its influence.
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improvements. This paper provides an account of a qual-
itative process evaluation of a randomised controlled trial 
(RCT) where PRASE was tested. PRASE was designed,5 6 
tested for feasibility7 and trialled8 9 between 2010 and 2015. 
This period has been charted as an era of paradigm shift 
for patient safety research when the dominant ‘measure 
and manage’ orthodoxy has been enriched by approaches 
sensitive to setting and sociocultural/political influences.10 
It became essential for a process evaluation to capture the 
nuances involved in the PRASE implementation.
Process evaluations have been used to explain subop-
timum outcome effects, specifically whether there was a 
‘fault’ with the intervention itself, its key components or 
with delivery.11 Latterly, they are often not only concerned 
with adherence to original plans but also with broader 
issues such as unintended consequences or the strengths 
and weaknesses of the intervention itself.12 Some process 
evaluations have been able to identify a precise ‘pinch 
point’ or problem with an essential component of the 
intervention that caused it to fail. In a UK trial of peer-led 
HIV prevention for gay men in London, no effect was 
shown. A qualitative process evaluation13 revealed that the 
essential component of ‘peer educator’ had not played 
out as intended during the course of the trial due to 
recruitment problems and the inability of peer educators 
to confidently communicate harm reduction messages 
to intended targets. Other process evaluations have 
been able to point to more general cultural or structural 
reasons why an intervention may not have succeeded. 
Dixon-Woods et al14 evaluated why a US-developed patient 
safety intervention—regarding decreasing central line 
infections in intensive care units—struggled with imple-
mentation after the intervention was transferred to a 
UK setting. A post hoc qualitative evaluation revealed 
multiple reasons why, largely the result of cultural differ-
ences between the US and UK settings. It is clear from 
these examples that process evaluations can support the 
largely ‘experimental’ aim of RCTs by identifying specific 
‘pinch points’ within an intervention itself or within the 
context that will help to explain success or failure.
The components of the intervention have been 
reported in detail elsewhere,8 as have the results of the 
randomised controlled trial which demonstrated no 
statistically significant effect between the intervention 
and control wards.9 A feasibility study was undertaken 
prior to commencement of the full RCT and details of 
our logic model and moderating factors are reported in 
the feasibility write up.7 Here, we provide a synopsis of 
the intervention and results of the trial for the reader to 
be able to view our process evaluation in context.  Online 
supplementary appendix 1 provides a detailed summary 
of the cyclical activities and facilitative processes of the 
intervention that were trialled, alongside anticipated 
outcomes. Online supplementary appendix 2 describes 
the trial design and results. Briefly, this was a cyclical 
study with two phases of: (1) collecting patient feedback 
about safety from patients at the bedside; (2) collation of 
these data and ward staff interpreting them; (3) ward staff 
action planning to improve patient safety and (4) plans 
before, being implemented and monitored.
MeThods
We conducted a robust process evaluation involving 
differing qualitative and quantitative methods8 which gath-
ered comprehensive data about all 17 intervention wards. 
We drew on a published framework12 for designing process 
evaluations of cluster RCTs. The main a priori research 
question was: ‘where does the intervention work, how 
and why?’8 In this paper, we have chosen to focus on the 
‘how’ and ‘why’ and present a detailed picture of how staff 
engaged with the intervention. We now apply our original 
research question to understand how and why the inter-
vention did not work, given the intervention did not have 
a significant effect on outcomes. Six mixed methods were 
used in the wider process evaluation but due to the extent 
and depth of the data collected, we focused intensively on 
three qualitative methods for the purpose of this paper. 
The methods described below are those most pertinent to 
exploring how staff engaged with the intervention in the 
ways they did, and why. Data were collected between August 
2013 and November 2014. National Health Service (NHS) 
ethical approval was granted in March 2013. LS, CM and 
JOH undertook methods 1 and 2. LS and CM conducted 
method 3. LS is a sociologist, JOH is a psychologist and 
CM has a background in sustainability. All were working as 
researchers on this study and educated to doctorate level in 
their respective fields.
In-depth analysis of taped discussion between ward staff
Action planning meetings (APMs) were digitally recorded 
for all 17 wards at both phases. At phase 2, one ward did not 
meet so we considered the recordings of 33 APMs. These 
ranged in length from 27 to 80 min (average 43 min). Our 
examination focused on which areas of patient feedback 
staff chose to make action plans on and which areas they 
chose not to. We wrote detailed notes while listening to 
the voice file. We structured our notes under the head-
ings: (1) issues seen as important where actions were 
made (and why) (2) issues seen as important where no 
actions were made (and why not); (3) issues dismissed 
and reasons for this; (4) comments made by staff about 
PRASE process/study/team and (5) comments made by 
staff about the ward or hospital context.
Facilitator’s field notes
These notes were written shortly after the APM had finished 
and captured (1) implicit dynamics between staff, such as 
body language, tone of voice and other non-verbal cues, 
(2) environmental factors, such as descriptions of the phys-
ical space where the meeting was held and (3) facilitator’s 
overall impressions. Field notes were brief and gave a ‘snap-
shot’ of the meeting. There were three facilitators (LS, CM 
and JOH) across the 17 intervention wards, and each facili-
tator worked with the same wards across both phases of the 
study to ensure continuity. Field notes were also taken at key 
meetings and events held with Trust senior management 
 3Sheard L, et al. BMJ Open 2017;7:e014558. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2016-014558
Open Access
personnel (particularly during set up and roll out of the 
study). These notes assisted in providing the research team 
with tacit knowledge of the culture of the site in which the 
intervention was being implemented.
Follow-up telephone interviews conducted with the aPM 
lead
The purpose of these short, structured phone interviews 
was to ascertain whether action plans had been success-
fully implemented or not and why. They were conducted 
around 6 months after the APM, with the ‘PRASE lead’ for 
each ward. Each ward was responsible for nominating a 
named member of ward staff—who was part of the action 
planning meeting—to be the PRASE lead. This could be 
any member of the team but more often than not, the 
person who volunteered for the role was a senior nurse. 
A structured interview guide was used. Researchers had a 
proforma in front of them which contained details about 
each action plan per ward and they asked the PRASE lead 
whether each action plan had been implemented—yes, no 
or partially. Open questioning then continued to under-
stand the factors surrounding this. Five additional questions 
were asked which focused on the PRASE lead’s opinion of 
the facilitative processes embedded in the study.
For the purpose of this paper, we wanted to under-
stand qualitatively how wards had engaged (or not) with 
the PRASE intervention. Implementation fidelity (which 
captures adherence to specific intervention components) 
is reported quantitatively elsewhere.9 Engagement of staff 
with an intervention can be considered as closely aligned 
but different from this, referring more to the differing 
approaches and attitudes that staff take to the task in hand 
(implementation of different components of the inter-
vention). This is different to whether they have simply 
delivered the task or not. We decided not to adhere to 
a numerical/scale definition of ‘engagement’ whereby 
differing wards attained a binary definition of either 
‘engaged’ or ‘disengaged’ with the intervention. Instead, 
we undertook a nuanced analysis of staff approaches and 
attitudes to: conducting an action planning meeting, 
creating quality action plans and implementation of these 
action plans. We explored ‘engagement’ as a concept 
that we define as the ‘depth’ and ‘nature’ of ward teams’ 
approaches and attitudes to the intervention.
Informed by this understanding of engagement, a 
synthesis of the above data sources has provided us with 
a rich account of the ‘engagement trajectory’ of each 
ward and this was realised by creating a pen portrait of 
engagement. Pen portraits have been used previously 
in applied health research in fields as diverse as: end of 
life care,15 vulnerable old people being enabled to keep 
warm in their homes16 and sleeping practices among 
homeless drug users.17 Previously, they have provided a 
narrative account of a ‘typical’ participant in qualitative 
studies or as an analytic aide memoir. We used them in 
a slightly different manner to document the ‘journey’ of 
the wards throughout the trial from the perspective of the 
researcher who had worked closely with these wards for 
over 18 months. There is a lack of methodological litera-
ture pertaining to the construction of a pen portrait and 
this has been left to the discretion of individual research 
teams. We created a basic structure for the pen portraits 
which centred on the writing of a linear, longitudinal 
account of how each ward had engaged with relevant 
key components of the intervention and the contextual 
factors which influenced this, ensuring that all three data 
sources were drawn on. We did not use an existing theory 
or framework on which to extract the data for the pen 
portraits as we wanted the emergent findings to arise 
inductively from the data set. As staff engagement was our 
focus, we included as much material on this as possible 
(along with explanatory factors and necessary descrip-
tion). We excluded minutiae which did not add to the 
‘big picture’ of the ward team’s engagement to maintain 
a focused pen portrait. The pen portrait for Holly ward 
is shown in online supplementary appendix 3 with the 
prose annotated as an illustration of how portraits were 
constructed from the three data sources outlined above.
Researchers took into account all the information 
contained within the pen portrait and attributed an overall 
‘engagement trajectory’ label to each ward. LS wrote all 
pen portraits for Trusts A and B and CM  for Trust C. We 
categorised the 17 different ward engagement trajectories 
into five main ‘engagement typologies’, which emerged 
from an analytical session centring mainly on consensus 
discussion between LS and CM.
We report three overarching themes in this paper, which 
are described in detail in the Findings section which follows. 
The above categorisation of engagement typologies led to 
the content of the first theme. After we were confident of 
the findings of this first theme, we then used the differences 
in engagement detailed in this theme to progress to themes 
2 and 3. To achieve this, we looked between and across the 
engagement trajectories of all 17 wards to understand how 
engagement with the intervention related to components of 
local implementation. We returned to the detail of the pen 
portraits to understand commonality and difference, and 
from this we developed the coding framework for themes 
2 and 3. We then checked our assumptions by testing the 
data in the pen portraits against our initial coding frame-
work. After minor adaptions, we then coded the data in all 
17 pen portraits. Overall, we used techniques derived from 
‘adaptive theory’18 which allows for high level frameworks 
and conceptualisations to emerge from data rather than 
descriptive themes. Adaptive theory proposes a continual 
engagement between the arising empirical data and arising 
theoretical interpretations of the research, working in a 
continuous cycle with each cycle generating new explora-
tions.
FIndIngs
We now set out to understand the ways in which the 
17 intervention wards engaged with the intervention. 
We are interested in how a multiplicity of engagement 
styles could have made an already complex intervention 
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become hypercomplicated in its implementation phase. 
This ‘hyper complexity’ may have served to dilute key 
elements of the intervention. By ‘dilution’, we mean 
‘non-standardisation’ of the intervention group, thereby 
reducing the potential for this to be meaningfully 
compared with a control group. We explore three high 
level themes, which emerged from the data. First, we will 
describe how there were palpable differences in the ways 
that ward teams engaged with the intervention. Next, we 
will look at how support for the intervention at the level 
of the Trust does not indicate ward-level support. Lastly, 
we will demonstrate that standardisation of facilitative 
processes by the research team does not ensure this filters 
down to implementation standardisation by ward staff. All 
quotation extracts are taken from pen portrait notes and 
all ward names have been ascribed a pseudonym.
The same intervention can be interacted within highly 
divergent ways
We were able to distinguish the intervention wards into 
five main ‘engagement typologies’ (see online supple-
mentary appendix 4). They are the following:
 ► consistently engaged throughout (seven wards)
 ► partially engaged throughout (four wards)
 ► increasing engagement as trial progressed (two wards)
 ► decreasing engagement as trial progressed (two 
wards)
 ► disengaged throughout (two wards).
Consistently engaged
This represents the largest category of how wards chose 
to participate in the trial with 7 out of the 17 residing 
here. These wards were fully signed up to the ethos of 
listening to and acting on patient feedback. They took 
part in a high proportion of the key components of the 
cyclical activities and made quality action plans which 
were largely implemented in both phases. A quality action 
plan can be defined as one which seeks to address issues 
identified in the patient data and was realistic, relatively 
timely and more than likely to be achieved. Motivation to 
take part in the research was high and improving patient 
safety was even higher.
Partially engaged
 These four wards generally did everything asked of them 
by the research team and largely participated in interven-
tion components but were sometimes lacklustre in their 
motivation towards improving patient safety. At times, it felt 
like action planning was just ‘going through the motions’. 
The ability of staff to implement action plans was mixed 
although this was sometimes due to external factors rather 
than inertia on the part of the ward staff themselves.
Increasing engagement
These two wards began their involvement with the trial 
in an ambivalent and—in the case of Maple ward—even 
hostile manner. However, as the study progressed and the 
ward staff began to understand what the research team 
were trying to achieve, engagement with the study solid-
ified. The similarity between these two wards (despite 
being at different Trusts) is that the turning point for 
their engagement was attendance at the peer-centred 
midpoint meeting. This is reflected in Maple ward’s 
complete U-turn with implementation of quality action 
plans at phase two as compared with partial implementa-
tion of weak action plans at phase one.
Decreasing engagement
Conversely, another two wards engaged with the study rela-
tively well at the beginning but, over time, slipped in their 
level of interest and involvement. Cherry ward is the only 
ward across all 17 who did not meet in an APM in phase 
two. The follow-up telephone interview revealed that the 
ward manager for Cherry did not believe the study was 
a priority. Oak ward had ambitious plans for their phase 
one action planning but had become dejected by the 
amount of time their plan was taking to come into effect. 
Subsequently, they declined to make an action plan in the 
phase two APM and appeared disengaged in the study.
Disengaged throughout
Although these two wards met in APMs for both phases 
of the trial, they were not interested in using the PRASE 
data to improve patient safety and viewed the study as a 
burden. However, the reasons for this response differed. 
Rowan were a low-performing ward whose ward manager 
preferred to concentrate on other initiatives rather than 
our research study. Elm ward were outwardly hostile to 
the ethos of the study, critical of the comments their 
patients had made to researchers and defensive of staff 
members. Despite agreeing to hold an APM, they consis-
tently refused to make action plans.
Through an examination of these differing engage-
ment trajectories, we can unpick where parts of the 
intervention may have led to divergent strategies for local 
implementation of the intervention on a ward-by-ward 
basis. These findings from ‘on the ground’ implementa-
tion by ward teams directly contradict some of the core 
assumptions held by the research team at the outset of 
intervention development—namely, that by providing 
facilitative processes, wards would be able to implement 
in a uniform manner. It is this aspect of a chasm between 
implementation expectations and reality which we now 
turn our attention to.
Trust-level support for an intervention does not predict the 
strength of ward-level engagement
A key assumption was that strong corporate, manageri-
al-level support by the three participating Trusts would 
facilitate high-level engagement by wards. However, an 
examination of the differing types of engagement trajec-
tories, shown in online supplementary appendix 4, throw 
doubt on this assumption and we can find little consis-
tency in engagement style between the wards at the same 
Trust. For instance, Trust A is a small district general 
hospital in a semirural, affluent area. This Trust prides 
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itself on being a forward thinking, cohesive workplace 
and senior management support for this intervention was 
exceptionally strong. However, when reduced down to 
the level of the ward, we can see that the four interven-
tion wards at Trust A are represented across four distinct 
engagement trajectories (consistent = Beech; increasing 
= Maple; decreasing = Oak; disengaged = Elm). Engage-
ment trajectories for each of the other two Trusts also 
differed considerably by ward. The implication here is 
that corporate culture—and receptivity to patient feed-
back at the level of the organisation—is not a simple 
predictor of engagement at ward level.
Unpicking these differences further, we find that 
despite a uniform message about the importance of a 
multidisciplinary approach to the study, wards seem to 
have interpreted this differently. Oak ward convened a 
strong first multidisciplinary APG with representatives 
from nursing, allied health professionals and support 
staff. In contrast, on some wards PRASE remained led 
and implemented by just one or two nursing staff. For 
example, Maple’s first APG consisted of just the ward 
manager, and pen portrait notes illustrate why.
A very tense meeting held with just the ward manager 
who appeared overtly stressed and about to implode. 
It was clear at this first APM that the ward manager 
had not understood the purpose of the study and 
became upset by some of the negative comments 
which her patients had made in the report. It was 
a difficult APM to convene as the ward manager 
thought she had to solve everything by herself and 
this was partially reinforced by the fact that she had 
not invited any of her staff to the APM. (Maple, 
Trust A)
The research team never envisaged that the interven-
tion would be taken on by just one or two members of 
ward staff, and this was actively discouraged throughout 
but still persisted in 5 wards at phase one and 6 wards at 
phase two, across the 17 intervention wards. It is difficult 
to suggest a clear reason why this happened but it was 
often related to:
 ► Front-line issues, such as no staff available to be 
released from direct patient care to attend APG;
 ► A minority of ward managers viewing the study as yet 
another patient safety initiative that they just needed 
to ‘get on with’;
 ► A misunderstanding of the multidisciplinary nature of 
the intervention.
Of most interest is the severe paucity of medical staff 
involved in the intervention with only four wards (all 
at Trust C) involving a medic. This was unforeseen at 
the outset and may have contributed to action plans 
that were narrower in scope than those generated by a 
strong multi-disciplinary meeting. Even those wards who 
managed to convene a strong multidisciplinary APG in 
phase one were often not able to sustain this level of input 
going into phase two. Towards the end of the study, it was 
disappointing to see that PRASE had unwittingly become 
badged as a ‘nursing initiative’. Medical and allied health 
professional input declined over time, and the workload 
was disproportionally being shouldered by individual 
ward managers (managerial nurses) who were for the 
most part already overloaded in their daily clinical roles.
Furthermore, an assumption was that a tight, coherent 
and most importantly consistent group of staff would 
engage with the intervention throughout the 14 months 
of staff involvement. In reality, staff movement around 
the NHS estate was high. This led to difficulties regarding 
ownership of action planning with some staff reluctant to 
proceed with action plans devised by their predecessors 
and others not believing it was worth the effort to become 
involved in the study if they were moving on shortly. A few 
ward teams changed their personnel completely between 
phase one and two of the study due to managerial reor-
ganisation.
A massive change in staffing took place around the 
latter part of Phase one with a new Ward Manager 
and 80%–85% change in ward staff. The second 
phone interview revealed that other ward initiatives 
were taking place…the whole PRASE process was 
never wholly embraced because of intense ward 
improvement work, and staff flux, taking place at the 
same time. (Chestnut ward, Trust C)
It was never anticipated that such wholesale change 
would take place at the level of the individual ward teams 
within the lifetime of the trial and the intervention was 
unprepared for this. There was little formal capacity to 
continually reintroduce PRASE to new ward staff, despite 
researchers having to perform this ad hoc and unexpected 
role. Critically, it points to ownership of the intervention 
on the ground as a key factor in success. The engagement 
with the intervention becomes weak if it is passed around 
large numbers of different staff or if staff groups change 
on a dramatic scale.
standardisation of facilitative processes by the research 
team does not necessarily ensure implementation 
standardisation by ward staff
A key intention of the facilitative processes was to ensure 
standardisation of implementation by ward staff. The 
process evaluation found that, in reality, these uniform 
training and facilitative processes resulted in little stan-
dardisation of approach to action planning regarding (1) 
the issues which staff chose to focus on or (2) whether 
the action plans were successfully implemented (or not). 
Our pen portraits point to three main issues that appear 
to underpin why:
 ► Implementation of action plans were often related to 
buy in and collegiate working with other departments, 
some of whom were not willing to spend time, resource 
and effort on an issue which was not their own;
 ► Existing pan-Trust safety and quality campaigns were 
prioritised over and above PRASE, to differing degrees 
which variably helped or hindered PRASE intentions;
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 ► Success was often the result of a complex interplay 
between the personal will of the staff involved in the 
APG and whether the study fitted into current ward 
priorities.
The following pen portrait excerpt from Apple ward 
exemplifies the first identified issue regarding buy in 
from other departments. This ward had several nega-
tive comments from patients that pain relief was not 
being given in a timely manner. To address this, the APG 
decided they needed assistance from pharmacy but this 
was not forthcoming and APG members were disap-
pointed. This led to the contradictory position in phase 
two of engagement still being very present but the act of 
action planning itself becoming tokenistic.
This ward stayed engaged with the project the entire 
way through despite setbacks with their earliest 
action plan. The ward manager in particular clearly 
understood the purpose of the study and was 
sympathetic to receiving patient feedback. However, 
inertia may have crept in as their ‘outside the box’ 
thinking in phase one did not get any buy in from the 
pharmacy department. Action planning in phase two 
then became perfunctory even though engagement 
was still high. (Apple, Trust B)
The second issue of other safety campaigns being prior-
itised above this study relates to the capacity with which 
ward staff have within their normal clinical roles to be 
able to undertake improvement work. In several of the 
pen portraits, PRASE was described as ‘just one of many 
improvement initiatives which this ward are involved in’. 
Wards were under pressure to take part in hospital-wide 
initiatives that executive teams had deemed to be of most 
importance. While there was senior support for PRASE, 
it was not always significant in comparison to other initia-
tives. In some cases, the existence of other high-profile 
campaigns supported staff in achieving their PRASE 
action plans. Trust C launched a well-received ‘Hello 
my name is…’ patient experience campaign tying into 
national acknowledgement of the need for staff to intro-
duce themselves and communicate better with patients 
at the bedside. On the wards where PRASE feedback had 
also drawn attention to this need, staff were supported 
to respond (through badges, awareness training and 
senior support) to do so.
However, the flip side of attention on more high-profile 
campaigns meant that—for some wards—PRASE became 
sidelined. Associated with this was a feeling of patient 
safety and quality ‘fatigue’ with the amount of initiatives 
in this area felt too numerous and therefore burdensome 
on staff time.
I got the sense that the ward manager saw PRASE as 
just another audit which she needed to go through 
the motions of…At one point during phase two, she 
admitted that in phase one she did not see the value 
in the study as she thought it just replicated other 
patient experience measures her ward is involved in. 
However, now she appreciates how it is different from 
the other measures. Working out where PRASE fitted 
in with other initiatives seemed to be a big issue for 
this ward manager. (Pine Ward, Trust B)
One strong finding to emerge was the use of PRASE data 
to reinforce safety or quality issues which the ward staff 
knew about tacitly but did not have robust data about to 
report to senior management. This finding emerged as a 
divisive issue. Some wards were pleased that the PRASE 
study reinforced staff opinion about the ward or validated 
on a larger scale the results of local audits. However, a 
minority of staff became irritated and instead viewed it as 
duplication.
dIscussIon
As introduced at the outset, some process evaluations 
are able to reveal specific ‘pinch points’ within the inter-
vention itself,13 or within the overall setting in which it 
was applied,14 which help to explain why no effect was 
seen. The Consolidated Framework for Advancing Imple-
mentation Research advocates the ‘inner setting’ of an 
organisation as being influential in whether or not imple-
mentation can be achieved, where attention must be paid 
to the domains of: structural characteristics, networks and 
communications, culture, implementation climate.19 Our 
process evaluation found that this inner setting was so 
varied between wards within the intervention group that 
this led to a general ‘dilution’ of intervention implemen-
tation. We found striking differences between wards across 
all the above domains of ‘inner setting’—stability of ward 
teams, quality of relationships between different wards, 
basic assumptions towards receiving patient feedback and 
a learning climate (or lack of one). Significantly, we saw 
changes to the ‘inner setting’ constructs over time. The 
in-depth analysis of what happened within the interven-
tion group generates useful insights for implementation 
of, and staff engagement with, patient safety initiatives to 
which we will now turn our attention.
The improvement of patient safety is already acknowl-
edged as a cultural issue and the importance of factors 
such as teamwork, leadership and organisational 
processes operating at and between multiple levels.20 
Navigating this territory—particularly the link between 
‘sharp end’ ward safety initiatives and ‘blunt end’ corpo-
rate planning—has been documented as a necessary 
challenge. Initiatives which do not pay adequate atten-
tion in this regard are at best destined to fail, and at worst 
may overburden already demotivated staff.21 The facilita-
tive processes incorporated into PRASE were designed to 
help address this challenge. These processes arose from 
the findings of feasibility testing of the intervention7 
where our research team found that, for example, access 
to senior management at regular intervals and assistance 
in interpreting patient feedback were important factors 
which may support action planning. The assumption was 
that by providing these processes, staff would be better 
placed to successfully navigate complex organisational 
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territory. It was anticipated this would allow some unifor-
mity among the intervention group. In actuality, the 
facilitative processes were not adequate to ensure any 
such uniformity.
Dixon-Woods et al22 22 developed a post-theorisation of 
why impressive results were seen in the original Michigan 
intervention—to decrease central line infections—in the 
USA. Six reasons are proposed as to why the programme 
worked. Of particular applicability is the ‘creation of a 
networked community’ where ward teams came together 
to build rapport and support for each other while iden-
tifying and resolving common barriers. Although part of 
the facilitative processes within the PRASE intervention 
aimed to attend to this need, it is likely that the commu-
nity of wards involved in the study never reached a critical 
threshold in becoming an organic community who regu-
larly reached out to each other. Further, specific leaders 
were targeted in the Michigan programme including 
hospital executives and clinical team leaders. This 
involvement of leaders at differing levels of the organi-
sation is theorised as being integral to the success of the 
programme. Conversely, we found that involving senior 
management and matrons prior to the start of the study 
and then throughout its entirety had minimal effect on 
strengthening engagement with the intervention on the 
ground by front-line ward staff. Questions regarding the 
ability of senior management to support consistency of 
intervention adoption throughout an organisation, and 
the processes required to enable this further, were raised 
by our study and certainly warrant further exploration.
In this study, the relationships between different parts 
and levels of the organisation from senior management to 
ward teams to individuals were vital in achieving success. 
When these levels align well, as they appeared to do in 
one Trust—with respect to a culture shift around intro-
ducing and communicating to patients via an external 
patient experience campaign—it appears that much can 
be achieved. When they do not—for example, Apple 
ward who did not get buy in from the pharmacy depart-
ment—staff at the ward level can become frustrated and 
demotivated. We therefore question the capacity of an 
externally designed intervention, even one with signifi-
cant resources and facilitative processes, to provide the 
mechanisms to be continually adaptive to the organi-
sational alignment between the sharp and blunt end 
at differing institutions. The challenges revealed here 
are about deeper organisational culture, systems and 
processes that need longer term development.
Our findings support the growing understanding that 
emphasis in patient safety research must continue to shift 
from the measure and manage orthodoxy of data collec-
tion to interpretation and process.10 In this research, the 
collection of patient feedback was the least problematic 
element. The complexity of what staff are being asked 
to do in interventions like PRASE (navigating multilay-
ered organisational systems to implement improvements) 
requires much more consideration. In the broader but 
related policy area of patient experience, the overt 
emphasis and huge resource allocated to collecting 
patient experience data have not been matched by efforts 
to use and evaluate the impact of feedback on service 
improvement.23 There is increasing recognition that 
using data sources to change practice demands creativity 
and skills from staff; hence the tendency to present staff 
with data and expect change to happen as a result.24 Our 
intervention considered these issues a priori and hence 
facilitative processes were built into the trial yet they were 
not sufficiently robust enough to ensure a standardised 
implementation across intervention wards.
One interpretation of PRASE could be that ‘it failed’ 
due to showing no effect between the intervention and 
control wards. We believe this a simplistic view which does 
not take into account the wealth of positive benefits which 
patients and staff gained. First, it showed that patients are 
able to give feedback about the safety and quality of care 
and that they want to do this en masse (our consent rate 
was 85% of those patients approached by researchers 
and the number of patients recruited to the study was 
2400 across five different hospital sites). Second, the 
process evaluation showed that most staff do believe the 
patient voice is important and there is an imperative to 
listen to, and act on, this voice. Third, despite local strug-
gles, most staff do want to action plan to improve their 
patients’ care. The majority of the wards were receptive to 
receiving patient feedback—it is when they tried to move 
improvement work forward that problems arose.25 An 
additional gain which some staff identified was the ability 
of the patient feedback to allow staff to understand not 
only the patient perspective but also their priorities and 
to visualise the ward environment and systems ‘through 
the eyes of the patient’.
Limitations
We cannot know whether positive attitudes towards 
patient involvement in patient safety have continued 
on the intervention wards after the trial was completed. 
Improvements that staff were working towards may have 
gained impetus since the research team left. Equally, 
involvement in the trial may have kick-started ideas 
which, although did not come to fruition within its life 
span, may now be fuelling ward level action. Conversely, 
staff may have felt disempowered to enact improvement 
to the ward environment if their PRASE action plans had 
floundered. We have no format for measuring this ‘after 
effect’—either positive or negative—and little scope for 
knowing at what time point the evidence of a more long-
lasting effect may be captured.
Our pen portrait methodology is a culmination of all 
sources of qualitative data collected and has its inherent 
weaknesses. This methodology is still in its relative infancy 
in relation to the way in which we have utilised it here. We 
were careful to draw equally on all sources of data to build 
a comprehensive narrative of the engagement trajectory of 
each ward. However, a differing analysis paying attention to 
fewer sources or an unequal weighing of sources may have 
pulled the narrative account in a slightly different direction. 
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Further, it was difficult to categorise some wards firmly into 
their allocated engagement typology and arguably some 
could fit into several. Finally, process evaluation methods 
were developed a priori to the start of the trial so the design 
was very open. We devised a loose structure to capture qual-
itative intelligence on key trial processes. If prior knowledge 
existed that diversity of engagement within the intervention 
wards was to be so significant, it may have been possible 
to target a particular process evaluation framework for 
analysing outcomes in relation to this diversity, such as 
the ‘diffusion of innovation model’.26 It is a possibility that 
utilisation of differing methods may have provided other 
answers as to where different elements of the intervention 
worked, for whom and why.
concLusIon
Whereas previous process evaluations point towards specific 
pinch points or broader cultural issues to understand why an 
intervention showed no effect, this study points to an overall 
‘dilution effect’ of the intervention. This was largely due to 
wards engaging with the intervention in highly divergent 
manners despite the standardisation of key components 
by the research team. The facilitative processes were inad-
equate to ensure full engagement across all wards in the 
study. A disconnect existed between senior management 
support for the study and how ward staff on the ground 
engaged with it more locally. The above findings assist in 
explaining why the trial saw no effect between intervention 
and control wards.
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